In this paper, I start out with a standard political economy of trade policy model to guide the subsequent estimation of the determinants of trade policy in a developing country. I carefully test the model with Colombian data from 1983 to 1998 accounting for endogeneity and omitted variable bias concerns and then expand it empirically in several directions. I show that it is important to control for the impact of a drastic trade reform shock that a¤ects all sectors and disentangle its e¤ect from preferential trade agreements (PTAs). I …nd that protection is higher in sectors that are important exports for preferential partners which may be seen as a stumbling block e¤ect of PTAs for Colombia. I also relax the assumption of …xed political weights that measure the extra importance of producers' welfare relative to consumers in the government objective. I measure the impact of sectoral characteristics on tari¤s indirectly through political weights as a novel alternative to nonstructurally estimating them as determinants of protection. Accordingly, I obtain more realistic estimates for the political weights further contributing to the literature.
Introduction
Although according to trade theory the optimal trade policy for a small open economy is free trade, in reality, trade protection in small developing nations is higher and more widespread than the rest. Using a standard political economy of trade policy model, I
start out by showing that protection in a small open economy will be inversely related to import penetration (imports/domestic production) and import demand elasticity which is a common result in several di¤erent models (Findlay and Wellisz 1982; Hillman 1982; Mayer 1984 ; Grossman and Helpman 1994 ; and so on). Then, I use this parsimonious model to guide the subsequent estimations at the 4-digit industry level (ISIC) tari¤ rates in Colombia from 1983 to 1998 and con…rm the prediction of the model which is consistent with the evidence in the empirical literature such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for US, Mitra et al. Second, I relax the assumption of …xed political economy weights attributed to producers and allow them to vary based on three sectoral characteristics that might mark up or discount these weights: 1) Share of employment in a sector, 2) …rm share as a proxy for concentration, and 3) labor to output ratio as a proxy for labor intensity. I rely on a short list of variables that were identi…ed to a¤ect trade policy in the earlier literature such as in Baldwin (1985) , Tre ‡er (1993), and Gawande (1998) . The novelty of the estimation approach in this paper is that rather than assuming a nonstructural relationship between protection and these variables, I empirically model them as factors directly in ‡uencing cross-industry political weights (and hence indirectly a¤ecting protection). I …nd that political weights are discounted for sectors with higher share of employment while they are marked up for labor intensive and concentrated sectors in Colombia. I also obtain more realistic estimates for the political weights by allowing them to vary across sectors over time.
Third, I consider the impact of the preferential/regional agreements by controlling for the sectoral share of imports from preferential partners and …nd that the protection is higher for sectors with higher share of preferential imports from the Andean Group. This evidence supports the …ndings in Limão (2006) for the US and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) Finally, I carefully address the potential endogeneity issues in the econometric model using an instrumental variables approach and perform several robustness checks.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the basic theoretical framework that guides the estimations and then in Section 3, I develop the econometric model and o¤er the empirical extensions as well as discuss speci…cation issues. In Section 4, I describe the data and present the estimation results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
I rely on a standard political economy model of trade policy that can be interpreted as the reduced form of a model where special interest politics is given micro-foundations like in Grossman and Helpman (1994) . This model is then used as a benchmark framework to motivate the empirics discussed in the next two sections.
I assume a small open economy where output and factor markets are perfectly competitive. The numeraire good i = 0 is produced with labor only, Y 0 (p 0 ) = L 0 , whereas the other goods, Y i (p i ) for i = 1; :::; n, are produced with labor and a sector speci…c factor (that is immobile across sectors). The population and world prices of all goods are normalized to one, p w i = 1 8i, and the numeraire good is traded freely. Therefore, the wage rate also equals one given a competitive labor market and assuming there is enough labor for the numeraire good to be always produced in equilibrium.
While consumers fail to overcome the collective action problem and organize for free trade (Olson 1965) , speci…c factor owners who constitute a negligible share of the population 1 get organized and lobby for protection in their own sector. Tari¤s are assumed to be the only form of protection for simplicity so the domestic price of nonnumeraire goods is p i = 1 + i , where i stands for both advalorem and speci…c tari¤ rates. 2 The government determines tari¤s by maximizing the following political support function
which is a weighted sum of aggregate consumer and producer surplus as well as tari¤ revenue.
is the aggregate import demand. Assuming away wasteful government expenditures, the tari¤ revenue,
, is rebated back to the public in its entirety. ! > 0 measures the additional political weight the government places on the welfare of speci…c factor owner lobbies relative to an average voter. In the absence of the political weight, ! = 0, equation
(1) boils down to a standard social welfare function without lobbying.
Maximizing equation (1) with respect to i and using p i = 1 + i we obtain the following …rst order condition for an interior solution
Therefore, the equilibrium advalorem/speci…c tari¤ rate for good i is implicitly de…ned
where " i (:) stands for the elasticity of import demand. 3 This expression is similar to those obtained in various political economy models as shown in Helpman (1997) . The tari¤ rate for sector i increases in the additional political weight placed on the well-being of producers, !, while decreases in the import demand elasticity, " i , and the import penetration ratio,
A tari¤ is a tax on imports so the deadweight loss from taxing imports is lower for more inelastic import demand. A relatively larger market for imports creates a greater price distortion potential putting a downward pressure on tari¤s, whereas the marginal bene…t of a tari¤ to a producer lobby is higher when it applies to more units.
Econometric Speci…cation

The Benchmark
As a benchmark, I …rst assume that tari¤s are determined by equation (3) for sectors i = 1; :::; N and over years t = 1; :::; T which in log linear and error form can be re-expressed as
3 Import demand elasticity is de…ned as
where^ = log!. Given the parsimonious nature of the model, to account for other industry speci…c characteristics that might make tari¤s di¤er across sectors in a systematic way, I then augment this model with industry …xed e¤ects
where i is a 1 N vector of industry dummies 4 , u it is the error term, and 1 are scalars, and 2 is an N 1 vector of coe¢ cients.
Trade Reform
I estimate tari¤s at the industry level over the 1983 to 1998 period in Colombia which like many other developing countries (e.g. Brazil, Turkey, India, etc.) went through signi…cant unilateral trade liberalization in the early 1990s (see Figure 1 ). 5 The average tari¤ rate went from 44% in 1983 down to 14% after the reform and given that there were not any …nancial crises during this time period that could potentially interfere with the analysis, Colombia provides a natural experiment environment for studying trade policy determinants and trade reform in a developing country. Import licenses were another common measure used along with tari¤s prior to trade reform but these were almost eliminated together with tari¤ liberalization (Edwards 2001) . Therefore, the reduction of tari¤ protection was not replaced by a new form of protection. Tari¤ rates are also better measured and they are positively correlated with import licenses. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I use e¤ective rate of protection (ERP), which is based on value added, as an alternative protection measure in Section 4.4 and show that the results with tari¤s hold under ERP.
It is important to account for the common trade reform shock across sectors while I 4 The i th column of i is 1 and the rest are zeros. 5 Although Colombia is a founding member of the World Trade Organization since 1995, the Colombian trade liberalization that took place starting in 1990 was not in response to a multilateral process, hence did not entail reciprocity (World Trade Organization 1996) . Yet, the unilateral liberalization that occurred prior to joining the WTO was recognized as part of Colombia's tari¤ concessions. 
, it is plausible to relax the time-invariance of ! and let it change to capture the move away from import substitution (trade reform) that hit all sectors from 1990 and onwards.
Empirically, I specify the trade reform e¤ect with a period dummy that measures the shift in the intercept starting in 1990
where REF t = 1 for t 1990 and zero otherwise, i is a 1 N vector of industry dummies, and it is the error term. 6 Based on theory, the expected sign for 1 is positive indicating that tari¤s are inversely related to elasticity adjusted import penetration ratio, (M=Y )". REF t points to a common decline in tari¤s across sectors due to the trade reform put in place in 1990 and onwards so before and after the reform eras. More speci…cally, log! t = n^ for t < 1990 +^ 2 for t 1990
Finally, the industry dummies account for …xed sectoral characteristics that might explain further cross-industry variation in tari¤s that are not already captured by the benchmark model.
Political Weights
Several other variables have been identi…ed as potential factors a¤ecting protection in the earlier empirical studies (see Baldwin 1985 for example). Based on this observation, it is plausible to argue that political weights may vary from one sector to the other over time (Karacaovali and Limão 2005) . I conjecture that the value of contribution from lobbies and the value of protecting industries for the government may be discounted or marked up based on sectoral characteristics. Therefore, I relax the assumption of …xed political economy weights across sectors and empirically model them to vary based on some alternative industry variables:
where (estimating the e¤ect of the …xed political weight on producer welfare, log !) is broken into …xed and variable (across sectors over time) portions: 0 and it = P k k Z kit . Here, Z kit is the k th factor measuring sectoral variation in political weights. Therefore, the political weights are estimated as follows
The important point to realize here is that rather than arguing for a reduced set of variables that might directly bear upon protection, I propose using a plausible group of variables that might impact the value attached to well-being of producers through protection granted to them by the government. In that respect, these variables directly a¤ect the political weights and hence only indirectly a¤ect tari¤s.
Keeping a parsimonious approach, I focus on k = 3 key industry level variables for Z kit :
1) Share of employment (ratio of employment in the sector to total employment in the economy); 2) …rm share (ratio of total number of …rms in the economy to the number of …rms in the sector) as a proxy for …rm concentration; 3) industry-level labor to output ratio as a proxy for labor intensity of a sector.
Intuitively, these three variables are expected to a¤ect the political weights as follows: 1)
An industry with a higher share of employment commands more votes and may thus be more likely to be favored by politicians (Caves 1976 ). However, with more workers, there might also arise a free-rider problem and therefore a weaker organization to demand protection in an industry (Tre ‡er 1993). Consequently, the expected sign of the coe¢ cient on share of employment is ambiguous: 1 7 0. 2) A higher ratio of total number of …rms in the economy to the number of …rms in an industry is a proxy for …rm concentration. A more concentrated sector indicates a stronger organizational power asking for protection (Olson 1965 ) so we expect 2 > 0. 3) Finally, labor intensive sectors may be favored based on a social justice motive as they may be impacted more adversely from import competition (Baldwin 1985) . Accordingly, we expect 3 > 0.
Preferential Trade Agreements
Preferential After controlling for PTA e¤ects, equation (8) can be modi…ed as
where ShM _Ande it is the share of imports from Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela to total imports in industry i, year t.
Speci…cation Issues
All estimations including the benchmark econometric model are potentially subject to endogeneity given the fact that elasticity adjusted inverse import penetration, Y =M ", (the main right-hand-side variable) is a function of domestic prices, hence tari¤s. Therefore, OLS estimation is expected to produce biased results. As a way to get around the problem of endogeneity, I use one period lags of all right-hand-side variables. Although this may alleviate the bias, it would not totally eliminate it given the persistence of the dependent variable (tari¤s) over time. Therefore, I consider an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. While the validity and strength of instruments will be discussed in Section 4.4, here I provide a brief intuition behind the choice of instruments.
First, I use import unit values as a proxy for world prices at the border which are correlated with domestic prices by de…nition but not tari¤s so they are useful to instrument for Y (:)=M (:)"(:). Second, I use a measure of scale (value added/number of …rms) as an instrument for import penetration given that scale is likely to be correlated with …xed costs of entry to an industry, hence a¤ect import penetration. However, scale is an inherent characteristic of a sector and once we account for industry size in the protection equation, its e¤ect is only indirect and it can be correctly excluded from the protection equation as done in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) . Third, I
rely on upstream total factor productivity (TFP) to instrument for the TFP of a sector, hence Y (:). Productivity in a sector is expected to be a¤ected by the average productivity of upstream sectors but upstream TFP is likely to be independent from sector's own tari¤s.
Despite relying on a theoretical model and addressing several factors that might de…ne tari¤s, the estimations may still su¤er from an omitted variable bias. Therefore, I use industry …xed e¤ects in all speci…cations while the instrumental variables approach is also expected to reduce such bias. Finally, other econometric concerns are addressed in Section 4.4 after estimation results are discussed next.
Empirics
Data
The data for the estimations cover 1983, 1985, and 1988 through 1998 and the de…nitions of all the variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Table A Table 1 lists the average tari¤ rates and their dispersion across 4-digit industries for the main sample. There is a sharp reduction in the average tari¤ rates starting in 1990 while the dispersion declines to a lesser extent which can be observed from the coe¢ cients of variation. 9 The same trend can also be observed in Figure 1 which depicts the tari¤ rates at the 4-digit industry level over time. The trade reform a¤ects all sectors, yet there is crossindustry variation which I conjecture to be attributed to political economy forces based on the econometric model developed in Section 3. Therefore, various speci…cations of the model are tested formally in the next section. 
Descriptives
Estimation Results
The Benchmark Model and Trade Reform
As discussed in Section 3.5, endogeneity of the main right-hand-side (RHS) variable, elasticity adjusted inverse import penetration ratio X=M ", is a valid concern so I …rst con…rm that endogeneity is present with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Then, as an initial step to address this concern, I use one-period lags of the right-hand-side variables. However, given the persistence in variables, this will be a weak method to address the endogeneity so I resort to an instrumental variables (IV) approach next. More speci…cally, I use the two-step e¢ cient generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) estimator which is robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form due to its use of an optimal weighting matrix (Cragg 1983 ). I test for heteroskedasticity using a Pagan-Hall (1983) test and …nd it to be a problem so this further justi…es the use of an IV-GMM estimator.
Although the estimates will be biased, I present the results from Cragg's heteroskedastic ordinary least squares estimator (HOLS) in the …rst four columns of Table 2 for comparison with the IV-GMM results in the last four columns. In Columns 1 and 5, I test equation (5) and in columns 2 and 6, I retest the same benchmark speci…cation using one period lags of the main RHS variable and its instruments instead. There is a strong support for the benchmark political economy model, where elasticity adjusted import penetration is found For instance, in 
Political Weights
In Table 2 , columns 5 and 6, I estimate equation (5) and its variant with the one-period lag of Y =M , respectively. As indicated in equation (7), the constant term provides an estimate for the …xed political economy weight, !, which is equal to 0.016 in column 5 and 0.008 in column 6. Similarly, equation (6) We now turn to the estimates for equation (8) where the political weights are speci…cally designed to vary across sectors over time based on three sectoral characteristics: 1) Share of employment, 2) …rm concentration, and 3) labor intensity. In the …rst three columns of Table 3 , each variable is …rst considered one at a time. We see that the political weights for concentrated and labor intensive sectors are marked up while they are discounted for sectors with a high share of employment. As discussed in Section 3.3, more concentrated sectors will have stronger producer lobbies demanding protection so the political weights and hence protection is higher in them. Labor intensive sectors are more adversely a¤ected from increasing import competition so they are given a higher weight and protected more. 11 The expected e¤ect of employment share is ambiguous, since more workers have a bigger voting
power, yet they might …nd it more di¢ cult to get organized. In Colombia, sectors with a lower share of employment have a bigger weight. All estimates are signi…cant at the 1% level in the …rst three columns.
Although the negative coe¢ cient for share of employment may seem counterintuitive, it is highly and negatively correlated with …rm concentration so it might indeed be capturing the lack of organizational power in a sector. As a matter of fact, when we use both variables Applying equation (9), we can estimate the political weights that vary across sectors over time controlling for all three variables. The average political weight estimate before 1990 is 0.246 which decreases to 0.115 afterwards. In Figure 2 , the variation in political weights is illustrated over the sample period. The cross-industry variation is noteworthy. In Table   A only provides a plausible alternative to …xed political weights but also produces more realistic estimates for them as compared to earlier studies in the literature.
Preferential Trade Agreements
In Table 4 column 1, I present direct estimates of equation (8) One may suspect whether ShM _AN DE it could be endogenous to tari¤s. The fact that I use the lag of ShM _AN DE it should alleviate such a potential problem. However, I also speci…cally test the exogeneity/orthogonality of this variable with a C-test (Baum et al. 2007 ) and con…rm that it is not endogenous. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a correlation between tari¤s and this share so its impact on tari¤s can be estimated maintaining the assumption of its orthogonality to the error term.
In columns 4 through 6, I estimate variants of equation (10) 
Robustness
In Table 5 , I present the results for di¤erent robustness checks. In column 1, I use e¤ective rates of protection (ERP) as opposed to tari¤s as the dependent variable and …nd that the results are consistent. ERP measures protection on value added by considering the e¤ect of tari¤s on inputs as well. Since ERP was computed by National Planning Department (DNP) and I do not have access to its computation procedure, I use this measure only to check sensitivity.
In column 2, I check the robustness of the results to the use of year e¤ects instead of the trade reform period dummy and show that results are not a¤ected qualitatively. However, for purposes of this study, it is important to directly account for the e¤ect of trade reform which I modeled as a common shock a¤ecting all sectors due to a change in the government perception about the value of import substitution policies, as discussed in Section 3.2.
In column 3, I use an alternative time-invariant import demand elasticity measure from Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) and in column 4, I apply an errors-in-variables correction to this measure following Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) given that elasticity is a generated regressor and may be mismeasured. We see that the results are robust to using these alternative measures and the IV-GMM approach should further alleviate the measurement problem.
Therefore, my original time-varying import demand elasticity measure is the preferred one.
Finally, tari¤ rates in general are censored from below given that they cannot be negative so in column 5, I test the robustness of the results to IV-GMM procedure by considering Newey's two-step tobit estimator (IV-Tobit) instead. The results are not sensitive to using IV-Tobit and also given the fact that all tari¤ rates are actually positive both before and after the trade reform in Colombia, I do not expect the potential censoring from below to be a problem for my data set.
Conclusion
Based on a standard political economy of trade policy model, tari¤ rates are expected to be inversely related to elasticity adjusted import penetration ratio in a small open economy. I con…rm this …nding for Colombia and also expand the benchmark model in several directions. share of the Andean Group countries to Colombia and …nd that protection is higher in sectors which are important for the preferential partners. This is in line with the stumbling block rationale such that erosion of preferential bene…ts will be slowed down because the elimination of preferences would mean the end of the PTA itself.
Given that Colombia experienced a substantial trade reform on a unilateral basis, it is important to disentangle the e¤ect of PTAs from the e¤ect of unilateral trade liberalization by explicitly accounting for it. Moreover, one way to solve the puzzle of unrealistically low estimates of the political weights in the literature may be to relax the assumption of …xed weights and allow them to vary based on sectoral characteristics as I do in this paper. n/a n/a n/a n/a Hansen's J p c n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.597 0.544 0.258 0.351 Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. (3) "L." stands for one-period (year) lag. (4) All specifications include industry fixed effects that are jointly significant but not reported. a "HOLS" stands for Cragg's heteroskedastic ordinary least squares estimator. b "IV-GMM" stands for instrumental variable two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. The instruments are import unit values, log(scale), and upstream TFP in columns (5) and (7) and their one-period lags in columns (6) and (8) . c "Hansen's J p" row reports the p-value for the Hansen's (1982) J test of overidentifying restrictions for instrument validity. 
